Magēmā Technology LLC v. Phillips 66, et al., No. 2024-1342 (Fed. Cir. (S.D. Tex.) Sept. 8, 2025). Opinion by Bumb (sitting by designation), joined by Moore and Stoll.
Magēmā sued Phillips for infringement of a patent related to desulfurizing heavy marine fuel oil (HMFO). The dispute centered on whether Phillips’ refinery operations infringed certain claims requiring that high-sulfur HMFO comply with ISO 8217 standards before hydroprocessing. During discovery, Magēmā sought certain test results from Phillips, but Phillips argued that it would be too dangerous to collect actual test data and that Magēmā could instead use a generally accepted formula. The district court agreed and denied Magēmā’s motion to compel Phillips to produce actual test data.
At trial, Phillips introduced a new noninfringement theory, arguing to the jury (over Magēmā’s objection) that actual test data is needed to prove infringement. The jury returned a verdict of noninfringement on all asserted claims. Magēmā then moved for a new trial, arguing that Phillips’ late-stage theory was both improper and prejudicial. The district court agreed that the theory was improper and prejudicial but nonetheless found the error harmless, reasoning that the jury could have based its verdict on other claim limitations. Magēmā appealed.
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Phillips’ repeated arguments regarding the necessity of actual test data were improper and prejudicial but held that the arguments were not harmless. The Federal Circuit explained that “we may only uphold a jury’s general verdict with an erroneously submitted theory under a ‘harmless error gloss’ if we are ‘totally satisfied’ or ‘reasonably certain’ that the verdict was not based on the erroneously submitted theory.” Applying that standard, a new trial was warranted here.
The Federal Circuit next turned to Phillips’ alternative grounds for affirmance, where Phillips argued that the district court erred in construing the claim term “HMFO.” The Federal Circuit disagreed, ruling that the district court’s construction was correct because Magēmā had acted as its own lexicographer in defining HMFO in the specification, and the district court’s construction tracked that lexicography.
Future Link Systems, LLC v. Realtek Semiconductor Corp., Nos. 2023-1056, -1057 (Fed. Cir. (W.D. Tex.) Sept. 9, 2025). Opinion by Stoll, joined by Reyna and Bryson.
Future Link filed two patent infringement actions against Realtek, alleging that Realtek’s integrated circuit products infringe several Future Link patents. Future Link eventually produced a license agreement between itself and a Realtek competitor, MediaTek. In the agreement, MediaTek agreed to pay Future Link a lump sum if Future Link filed a lawsuit against Realtek. Within days after producing the agreement, Future Link voluntarily dismissed both cases against Realtek without prejudice.
Realtek then filed motions asserting that Future Link had filed objectively baseless suits and requesting attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), Rule 11 sanctions, fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and relief from certain discovery restrictions. The district court denied Realtek’s motions except for granting-in part Realtek’s motions for sanctions under the court’s inherent power by ordering that the voluntary dismissals be modified to become dismissals with prejudice. Realtek appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed whether Realtek qualified as a “prevailing party,” which would entitle Realtek to pursue attorney fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1). The Federal Circuit held that Realtek did meet the prevailing party standard because the dismissals with prejudice materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1) and remanded for consideration of whether the case was exceptional and whether fee awards are appropriate.
As to the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions, the Federal Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the sanctions because Future Link’s counsel had conducted a reasonable pre-suit investigation.
As to the district court’s denial of fees under § 1927, the Federal Circuit noted that § 1927 requires a high standard of culpability that was not met. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of fees under § 1927 because the district court had “applied the appropriate law” and the Federal Circuit discerned “no abuse of discretion in the district court’s analysis.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit considered a challenge by Realtek to certain discovery rulings, specifically regarding access to confidential materials. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court because there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to maintain standard protective order procedures, including requiring counsel to file a notice of appearance to access confidential information. The Federal Circuit explained that Realtek’s arguments did not demonstrate “good cause” for an exemption from these procedures.