Our Patent Case Summaries provide a weekly summary of the precedential patent-related opinions issued by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the opinions designated precedential or informative by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
Satius Holding, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., et al.
No. 2025-1446 (Fed. Cir. (D. Del.) Oct. 1, 2026). Opinion by Moore, joined by Lourie and Hughes.
Satius sued Samsung for infringing a patent that claims a “communications apparatus for transmitting electric or electromagnetic signals over air.” The district court found the claims indefinite and thus invalid because it was an “undisputed scientific impossibility to transmit electric signals over air.” Satius appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity but on a different ground, holding that the claims are not indefinite but are invalid for lack of enablement.
Beginning with the question of indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit construed the claim limitation to mean transmitting signals over air in electric form, which both parties acknowledged is scientifically impossible. In reaching that construction, the court emphasized that, where claims are susceptible to only one reasonable construction, they “must” be construed “based on the patentee’s version of the claim as he himself drafted it.”
The Federal Circuit then ruled that, as construed, the claims are not indefinite because they “are clear about what they cover,” and “indefiniteness is not the same as impossibility.” The court thus determined the claims to be “definite notwithstanding their recitation of a scientific impossibility.”
Turning to enablement, although the district court had declined to reach the issue, the Federal Circuit saw “no bar to [its] consideration of the issue on appeal,” particularly because the issue involved a question of law and was briefed by the parties, and because its “proper resolution is beyond any doubt.”
On the merits, the Federal Circuit noted that to comply with the enablement requirement, “the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims.” The court held that “this standard cannot possibly be met when, as here, the claims include an express limitation that adds inoperable (and thus non-enabled) alternative embodiments to the scope of the invention.” Thus, “because the claims explicitly cover a scientific impossibility that cannot be made or used by a skilled artisan,” the claims were held invalid for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Epic Tech, LLC v. Pen-Tech Associates, Inc.
No. 2025-1624 (Fed. Cir. (N.D. Ga.) Sept. 30, 2026). Opinion by Moore, joined by Cunningham and Subramanian (sitting by designation).
Epic Tech sued Pen-Tech for infringing a patent directed to an electronic sweepstakes system and method. Before suing, the PTO had rejected claims in three related Epic Tech patent applications—including two applications containing claims the PTO found patentably indistinct from those asserted against Pen-Tech—as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Also, in a different lawsuit (“Fusion Skill”), a different district court held claims of a related Epic Tech patent ineligible under § 101.
Pen-Tech moved for summary judgment of invalidity under § 101, and the district court agreed. Pen-Tech also moved for Rule 11 sanctions against Epic Tech and its counsel, and moved for attorneys’ fees under § 285, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s inherent power. The district court denied these motions, determining that Epic Tech’s and its counsel’s conduct were not “so unreasonable as to be frivolous” and that Epic Tech had not unreasonably or vexatiously litigated its case. Pen-Tech appealed.
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, ruling that the district court’s order provided insufficient detail to permit meaningful review. The Federal Circuit said “there were a number of strong indicators prior to the filing of the suit at issue that the asserted claims were invalid under § 101” and that, taken together, they “created a compelling concern over the validity of the claims before this litigation was brought.” The court explained that, “in such circumstances, it does not suffice for Epic Tech or its counsel to rely only on the presumption of validity when faced with multiple indicators that these claims were unpatentable under § 101.”
But the Federal Circuit held “only that the court failed to provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for rejecting Pen-Tech’s validity-based Rule 11 theory given Alice, the PTO’s § 101 rejections of similar claims, and the Fusion Skill order.” The court expressly did not decide whether Epic Tech or its counsel violated Rule 11, and did not decide “when notice of potential invalidity renders continued assertion of a presumptively valid patent unreasonable.”
The Federal Circuit applied the same reasoning to the district court’s denial of fees under § 285, § 1927, and the court’s inherent power. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded on those issues as well.
ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., et al.
Nos. 2026-1033, -1035 (Fed. Cir. (M.D. Fla.) Sept. 30, 2026). Opinion by Stark, joined by Prost and Chen.
ParkerVision sued Qualcomm for infringing two patents having claims that fall into two groups: “receiver claims,” directed to down-conversion of electromagnetic signals, and “transmitter claims,” directed to up-conversion of such signals. The claims in one of the asserted patents are all receiver claims, while the other patent includes both receiver claims and transmitter claims.
After an earlier appeal and remand, the district court construed the claims, and the parties stipulated to noninfringement of the receiver claims in both patents. The district court then granted partial summary judgment of noninfringement of the receiver claims.
Rather than proceed to trial or otherwise resolve the question of infringement of the transmitter claims, the district court—on motion by ParkerVision, opposed by Qualcomm—entered “final judgment” of noninfringement as to the receiver claims under Rule 54(b). The court then “severed and stayed” the transmitter claims pending completion of the appeal of the judgment on the receiver claims, and ParkerVision appealed.
The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied ParkerVision’s request for reassignment to a different judge. The court explained that “application of Rule 54(b) to a cause of action for patent infringement or patent invalidity is complicated by a nomenclature conundrum” because the rule governs actions presenting more than one “claim for relief,” permitting “entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims.” The Federal Circuit noted that the term “claim” “has a special meaning in patent law, which meaning is different from ‘claim’ in general civil procedure” including Rule 54(b).
The Federal Circuit identified the question presented as “whether Rule 54(b) permits, under the circumstances of this case, final judgment to be entered with respect to infringement of only some patent claims when other patent claims of the same patent remain unresolved.” The court ruled that the “answer is no.”
The Federal Circuit explained that “in most if not all instances, each patent can be the basis for a single cause of action for patent infringement, but not more.” Thus, as to the patent that included both receiver claims and transmitter claims, the Federal Circuit ruled that infringement of the receiver claims “is not a separate cause of action,” so “Rule 54(b) does not allow entry of partial final judgment, as the cause of action is not final.” As a result, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked a final judgment over which to exercise jurisdiction. The court also rejected ParkerVision’s various other arguments for appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, applying Eleventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit denied ParkerVision’s request to reassign the case to a different judge on remand. The court reasoned that the district judge’s expressions of frustration with this long-running litigation did not suggest partiality, and that reassignment would cause disproportionate waste and duplication.