Our Patent Case Summaries provide a weekly summary of the precedential patent-related opinions issued by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the opinions designated precedential or informative by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
Google LLC v. DDC Technology, LLC
Nos. 2025-1315, -1316, -1330 (Fed. Cir. (PTAB) Nov. 5, 2026). Opinion by Reyna, joined by Hughes and Stark.
DDC owns three patents directed to hand-held virtual reality viewers that receive smartphones in a housing and use an input mechanism to contact the smartphone’s touchscreen. Google filed IPR petitions challenging all three patents as obvious over a combination of two prior art references.
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that Google proved unpatentability for only some of the challenged claims. Google appealed as to the surviving claims, raising six issues. The Federal Circuit rejected each of them.
First, for certain claims, Google challenged the Board’s determination of nonobviousness, including its ruling that DDC’s objective indicia of nonobviousness (copying and industry praise) outweighed Google’s obviousness evidence. Google argued that the Board legally erred in its analysis of “copying” by comparing Google’s product and DDC’s allegedly copied products to the challenged claims rather than to each other. The Federal Circuit explained that Google correctly identified the required comparison as being “between the alleged patented devices and the alleged copied product,” but ruled that the Board performed such an analysis. Thus, there was no legal error.
The Federal Circuit also upheld the Board’s reliance on certain emails as evidence of industry praise. And the court saw no error in the Board’s weighing of the parties’ competing evidence and determining that “on balance” it supported a finding of nonobviousness.
Second, Google challenged a Board finding as being based on an incorrect construction of the term “disposed on.” Google argued that the Board erroneously construed the term to require direct contact, but the Federal Circuit disagreed. The court explained that Google’s argument “constructs a strawman,” as “the Board never concluded that the term requires direct contact.” Rather, the Board merely “disagreed that ‘disposed on’ includes indirect connections that are far removed.”
Third and fourth, Google challenged certain Board findings involving the claim terms “lever” and “guide.” Google argued that the Board erred in construing “lever” as requiring “a stiff body pivoted on a fulcrum,” and that the prior art lacked the “guide” limitation. The Federal Circuit upheld the construction of “lever” as supported by intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, and thus did not reach Google’s arguments over the “guide” limitation.
Fifth, Google argued that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act. According to Google, the Board implicitly construed the phrase “made from a flexible material” to mean “made only from a flexible material” without affording Google a chance to respond. The Federal Circuit disagreed because Google did not face “undue surprise” by the Board’s ruling. “Rather, Google had the opportunity to develop its position … but failed to do so.”
Sixth, Google challenged the Board’s implicit construction of the term “coupled to.” The Federal Circuit rejected the argument because the Board had said in its institution decision that it “welcomed additional argument and evidence” on the issue, and “Google failed to further address [the claim] after institution.” The court concluded that “Google had an opportunity to clarify and develop its argument as to [the claim] before the Board issued its final written decision and failed to do so.”

