On March 10, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced its first department-wide Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP), applicable to all criminal matters other than those related to antitrust violations. This policy fulfills a December 2025 promise by Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche and supersedes prior corporate enforcement frameworks used by all DOJ components outside the Antitrust Division and by all 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, including the “Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program for Financial Crimes” unveiled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York just two weeks ago.
After several years of expanding voluntary self-disclosure program proliferation—which have been analyzed in prior Alston & Bird advisories (available here, here, here, and here)—the DOJ is positioning this department-wide CEP as the single governing framework for its corporate criminal enforcement efforts. The policy aims to bring greater uniformity, predictability, and transparency to how prosecutors evaluate self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation. It also closely tracks the DOJ Criminal Division's Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, reflecting and reinforcing the division's leadership in DOJ corporate criminal enforcement.
The New DOJ-Wide CEP
The new CEP largely mirrors the structure and substantive incentives of the Criminal Division policy in offering three categories of potential benefits to companies:
- Declination. Companies that promptly and voluntarily self-disclose potential misconduct, fully cooperate with the DOJ’s investigation, undertake timely and appropriate remediation, and have no aggravating circumstances—such as egregious or pervasive misconduct or corporate recidivism—may receive a declination of prosecution, coupled with a requirement to pay all applicable disgorgement or forfeiture and any required victim restitution or compensation.
- “Near-Miss” Resolution. Companies that do not qualify for a declination (for example, because of delayed self-disclosure or aggravating circumstances), may be eligible for a non-prosecution agreement with a term of less than three years, no independent compliance monitor, and a 50%–75% reduction in fines (calculated from the low end of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline range).
- Limited Mitigation. Companies that fail to satisfy any of the three key criteria—voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and timely, appropriate remediation—face a cap on available fine reductions of 50% (typically from the low end of the applicable Guideline range) and an increased likelihood that the DOJ will impose an independent compliance monitor.
Key Differences from the Criminal Division Policy
- Greater Prosecutorial Discretion on Financial Penalties. The department-wide CEP shifts from the Criminal Division’s prior framing of a fixed 75% reduction from the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range for certain “near-miss” outcomes. Instead, it provides for a reduction of at least 50% but not more than 75%. While subtle, this important change affords DOJ prosecutors an added degree of flexibility in arriving at an agreed-upon resolution.
- More Reporting Avenues. The department-wide CEP requires voluntary self-disclosure to an appropriate department “criminal component,” rather than specifically to the Criminal Division, and frames cooperation as cooperation with the DOJ’s investigation rather than with the Criminal Division. While it is likely that an outsized percentage of corporate self-disclosures likely will continue to be made to the Criminal Division due to its experience and expertise in corporate criminal matters, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices are also likely to field an increasing number of voluntary self-disclosures as a result of the new policy.
- Explicit Reference to the M&A Safe Harbor Policy. The department-wide CEP expressly cross-references the DOJ’s department-wide Mergers & Acquisition (M&A) safe harbor policy, underscoring the DOJ’s expectation that compliance and disclosure analyses will be integrated into transactional workflows. This signals the DOJ’s awareness of M&A as a frequent pathway for identifying misconduct and aligns with DOJ’s goal of providing clearer incentives and a more predictable framework that “well-intentioned businesses” can rely on.
Looking Ahead
The DOJ framed the new CEP as an effort to align incentives and outcomes and made clear that the new CEP supersedes all component-specific and U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement policies currently in effect, other than those applicable to DOJ antitrust enforcement. As a result, district-level initiatives—including the recent program announced by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York—have been displaced.
That said, practical questions regarding whether and where to report remain. Although the DOJ has standardized the rules, companies will still need to assess which (if any) DOJ component is the most appropriate recipient of a disclosure and anticipate differences between DOJ components and offices when it comes to familiarity with CEP mechanics. Even under a single rulebook, experience matters: The DOJ’s Criminal Division has long administered CEP-style frameworks and may present fewer frictions around timing, process, and remediation expectations, but every potential self-disclosure will, as ever, have to be carefully evaluated to ensure an appropriate decision regarding whether and where to self-report is made.
At the same time, this unified DOJ corporate enforcement policy is likely to drive increased disclosure and enforcement activity by reducing uncertainty about the availability and contours of cooperation credit, which in turn adds urgency to corporate compliance investments. Companies should be prepared to identify potential misconduct quickly and stress-test compliance program effectiveness, since the greatest benefits under the new DOJ-wide CEP are only available when misconduct is deterred or promptly identified, and it is only through proactive compliance investments that compliance programs can be right-sized to meet this further evolved risk environment.
If you have any questions, or would like additional information, please contact one of the attorneys on our White Collar, Government & Internal Investigations team.
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