Disagreement among board members is often a fact of corporate life. In what remains, economically, a difficult exit environment for private capital investors, such disagreements are arguably on the increase.
But what the UK Supreme Court case of Saxon Woods Investment Ltd and others v Costa ([2026] UKSC 21) tells us is that disagreeing in the wrong way can have serious consequences for the director involved.
Background
Our previous advisory set out the background to the case and the previous decision of the Court of Appeal.
In short, the director’s conduct in the case involved actively delaying a sale of the company, contrary to what had been agreed in a shareholders’ agreement. That delay involved misleading the board and meant that an exit was not achieved before the COVID pandemic began, following which the value of the company declined.
The Supreme Court boiled down the issues on appeal to this question:
Can [a director] simply act single-handedly in driving the company towards his preferred objective, if necessary concealing what he is doing from his colleagues, or is his status as a fiduciary owing a duty of loyalty to the company, and the requirement that he act in good faith, sufficient to require him to disclose his opinion to his colleagues, to discuss it with them and to assist them in forming a collective view as to the best way forward for the company?
The director’s case was that so long as he genuinely believes that his preferred way forward is the most likely to promote the success of the company, then the means of achieving that path is entirely for the director to decide—even to the extent of misleading others.
It might reasonably be said that not misleading, or otherwise concealing information from, fellow board members must be near the top of any workable approach to healthy corporate discourse. But it was argued that the Companies Act 2006 allows a director that is genuinely convinced of his or her own correctness to do quite a lot in furtherance of that genuinely held objective. In short, that the ends justify even dishonest means.
Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 sets out the duty of directors to promote the success of the company and states:
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole... (our emphasis)
Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, on pure grammatical terms, that section may be read as only governing a director’s thinking, rather than their conduct. That would mean that, so long as the director genuinely believed that a certain course for the company would best promote its success, then the director may adopt any conduct to secure that outcome, including dishonesty and deception.
However, the Supreme Court held that pure grammatical readings can only take you so far. Instead, the proper construction of Section 172 was that the requirement for good faith relates not just to the director’s subjective thought process but also to the director’s conduct in pursuing his or her objective. While the starting point is that the Court is to give some leeway to the commercial judgment of a director, that commercial judgment needs to be grounded on a belief that is genuinely held. But more than this, the director cannot then rely on his or her genuinely held beliefs as a defence to any subsequent conduct, including conduct that goes behind the back of the board to undermine a properly made decision. As the Supreme Court held:
Far from promoting corporate success in the modern world, it would be a recipe for chaos and paralysis in corporate governance, and destructive of the collegiality of the board of directors as a whole which all stakeholders in limited companies are entitled to expect.
In finding the above, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal on the outcome of the case but did not adopt the same reasoning. The Court of Appeal framed the issue as whether the director acted dishonestly, which was to be assessed by an objective standard. In fact, the question was whether the director acted in good faith, to be assessed both by the director’s subjective belief and their objective conduct. The assessment of a fiduciary’s compliance with their duties had always been an objective question—a fiduciary’s belief that they were doing the right thing was (and is) never enough to exonerate that fiduciary.
What Does This Mean?
The facts of the case are stark—once the director was found to have misled and shielded matters from the board, any form of exoneration, by arguing that it was for the right reasons, would face serious challenges.
But interesting questions may arise in conduct falling below the wrongdoing in this case. There may well be scenarios, particularly in the context of nominated directors, where there will be strongly divergent commercial perspectives coupled with varying practical access to information between board members. The emphasis by the Supreme Court on Section 172’s integral relationship with board collegiality may help arguments in favour of greater transparency and up-front dealing between board members—and potential accusations that a director who withholds information is not acting in accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company.
There are, after all, no I’s in the phrase ‘duty to promote the success of the company’.
If you have any questions, or would like additional information, please contact one of the attorneys on our Financial Services & Investment Funds Litigation team.
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