On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court confirmed that President Trump had the power to dismiss two Democratic Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioners because he viewed their continued service as “inconsistent with [his] Administration’s priorities.” The decision is noteworthy because the FTC Act expressly limits the President’s ability to dismiss Commissioners to situations involving “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. §41. The Supreme Court effectively struck this provision from the statute, finding it “contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.”
The Court’s opinion in Trump v. Slaughter decreases the FTC’s insulation from partisan politics. In the short term, companies can expect the FTC’s broad antitrust and consumer protection authority to be more closely aligned with the priorities of the Administration in power. In the long term, the decision could form the basis for limiting some of that authority.
The Decision
In March 2025, President Trump dismissed the remaining two Democratic Commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, stating only that their “continued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with [his] Administration’s priorities.” Slaughter filed suit to be reinstated to serve the remainder of her seven-year term. She argued that her termination violated the FTC Act, which expressly limits the President’s authority to dismiss a Commissioner for reasons of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. §41.
The Court endorses at-will removal
In the 6-3 decision, written by Chief Justice Roberts and split along ideological lines, the Court rejected Slaughter’s argument and found that the FTC Act’s provision limiting the President’s power to dismiss Commissioners was unconstitutional. To reach its conclusion, the Court looked back to the drafting of the Constitution and the creation of the Executive Branch. Quoting George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, the Court emphasized that the Framers purposefully vested executive power in a single President.
Because executive power rested with a single President—the so-called unitary executive theory—the Court reasoned, the President must be able to appoint officers to help administer the execution of law—and to remove them at will. As the Court put it, “[t]hese officers were to serve as envoys of the President, not his equals.” No. 25–332, slip. op. at 7 (U.S. June 29, 2026). The Framers considered, and rejected, the notion that executive power should be shared among multiple individuals. The President therefore could not be subject to control by officers operating within the President’s bailiwick.
The Court overrules precedent
While the Court found ample support for the President’s general removal powers in the Framers’ historical writings, Trump v. Slaughter runs contrary to the Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor. In that case, the Court cited the termination clause of the FTC Act and found that President Roosevelt could not fire a sitting FTC Commissioner without cause. Humphrey’s Executor attempted to place the FTC outside the President’s general removal powers by noting the agency’s “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” nature.
In Trump v. Slaughter, the Court rejected that distinction. Citing later cases recognizing that the FTC exercises executive authority by drafting rules with the force of law, investigating businesses to ensure compliance with the law, and filing suits on behalf of the United States in federal court, the Court found that FTC Commissioners “fall within the President’s general administrative control” and must be removable at will. Congress, the Court held, cannot limit the President’s removal ability through the FTC Act’s for-cause provision.
The Court acknowledged that allowing President Trump to terminate a sitting Commissioner affiliated with an opposing political party at will may seem controversial but said the practice is not new. While many Presidents were hesitant to exercise their removal power, the Court pointed out that President Jackson “fired hundreds of subordinates for personal and partisan reasons.” No. 25–332, slip. op. at 13 (U.S. June 29, 2026) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Even Jackson’s detractors, the Court noted, considered his removal power settled.
Implications
By ruling in Trump’s favor, the Court removes one of the statutory provisions meant to insulate the FTC from party politics. Congress structured the FTC to prevent one political party (or President) from exercising outsized control of the regulatory agency. While the FTC Act allows the President to appoint the Commission’s Chair, it also limits party control by requiring that no more than three of the five Commissioners belong to the same political party and by giving each Commissioner a seven-year term.
The FTC Act’s for-cause provision sat on top of this bipartisan structure. By effectively striking the provision from the Act, the Court rendered the FTC more susceptible to the initiatives of a given Administration. Commissioners may now face greater pressure to align with a President’s agenda—regardless of party affiliation or remaining term length—or risk removal. That pressure could make minority-party Commissioners, if appointed, more cautious in expressing dissenting views, leaving American consumers and businesses with fewer counterpoints to the majority’s position.
Enforcement priorities may shift faster
For businesses, the Court’s decision means that the FTC’s attention could turn more quickly to the priorities of each newly elected President. Given the breadth of conduct the FTC could consider unfair, deceptive, or anticompetitive, Presidents now have broad latitude to direct the agency’s attention. Businesses have already seen signs of that shift. President Trump has dismissed sitting Democratic Commissioners, and Republican Commissioners have regularly referred to the agency as “the Trump-Vance FTC” in decisions.
In line with the Trump Administration’s priorities, Chair Ferguson and the other Republican Commissioners have pursued issues that historically have not been central to the FTC’s work, including enforcement involving companies with diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, professional organizations that develop standards for gender-affirming care for minors, and advertising agencies that the FTC believed colluded to suppress political viewpoints. This marks a departure from the FTC’s traditional focus on areas with bipartisan appeal, where enforcement priorities were more likely to continue across Administrations.
The effects may extend beyond the FTC
Trump v. Slaughter may also have a long-term effect on the scope of the FTC’s authority. Justice Gorsuch, concurring with Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, stated that the decision effectively hands legislative and judicial powers (such as the FTC’s rulemaking and administrative tribunal functions) to the Executive Branch: “The power to write new regulatory crimes still exists, but now the pen ultimately rests in the President’s hand. The ability to judge disputes in-house remains, but now the house is white.” No. 25–332, slip. op. at 11 (U.S. June 29, 2026) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The Supreme Court is almost certain to face these questions in the coming years and could narrow the FTC’s functions to those more traditionally associated with “executive law enforcement power.” Id.
The FTC and its administrative process also remain susceptible to constitutional challenges, such as those alleged in Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 598 U.S. 175 (2023), which allowed such challenges to be heard in federal court. For now, however, businesses face an FTC whose enforcement and policy priorities may be more directly shaped by Presidential priorities. And the effects of Trump v. Slaughter are not confined to the FTC. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence warns of the “weighty consequences” businesses may face from other independent agencies with similar removal provisions:
A business out of favor with the party in control of the White House might be able to stave off an FCC investigation. But can it survive a subsequent FTC rule declaring unlawful one of its longstanding trade practices? What about an in-house adjudication by OSHA? Or a prosecution for a new crime the SEC announces? Not to mention what these now-coordinated powers could do to disfavored individuals who lack the resources needed to fend off such attacks. It may be true that after today there is no more “fourth branch” of government. But the fourth branch’s powers still exist; they have just been reassigned to the President.
Id.
If you have any questions, or would like additional information, please contact one of the attorneys on our Antitrust team or one of the attorneys on our Consumer Protection/FTC team.
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